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 Abstract  
 Developmental psychologists have a long history of using triangle metaphors to 
conceptualise the social constitution of psychological development. In this paper, we 
present a genealogy of triadic theories, to clarify their origins, distinctions between 
them, and to identify key themes for theoretical development. The analysis identifies 
three core triangle models in the developmental literature. Each theory relies on some 
combination of the terms subject, object, other and sign, and they can be distinguished 
by the core psychological dynamic which they entail. We distinguish an emotional tri-
angle rooted in psycho-analysis, a mediational triangle rooted in the work of Vygotsky, 
and a sociocognitive triangle originating with Piaget. Despite their differences, the anal-
ysis reveals a common theme of the transformation from external mediation to internal 
mediation. Contemporary research and possible future directions are discussed in the 
light of the theoretical distinctions that our genealogy has revealed. 
 The triangle is one of the most persistent metaphors in developmental, cultural, 
and social psychology. This peculiarly geometric metaphor has been used to articu-
late the relationship of a subject with another person and the world [e.g., Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002], the relationship between three persons [Fivaz-
Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 2001] and the relationship between a person, ideas, 
and concrete objects [Carpendale & Müller, 2004]. Despite their prevalence, the uses 
of triangle metaphors have received little interrogation by their advocates. In this 
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paper, we critically examine the history and utility of triangle metaphors in develop-
mental psychology.
 The metaphors which we use in science are not mere communicative tools fa-
cilitating the communication of complex ideas. Rather, they are constitutive of those 
ideas [Leary, 1990; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999]. Complex ideas, including scientific 
theories, are not ‘mirrors of nature’ [Rorty, 1979], but semiotic artefacts which medi-
ate researchers’ relation to a given object of study. In other words, theories are part 
of the researcher’s apparatus or tool kit [Mead, 1936, p. 351]. Metaphors and theories, 
just like tools and instruments, connect researchers to nature and enable them to act 
upon nature. In everyday life, before using a tool, we need to consider the purpose 
for which it has been designed, and its suitability to our goals. Similarly, it is expect-
ed from researchers that they reflectively question the semiotic tools that they use in 
their theories, which make visible certain phenomena while occluding others, and 
which construct their reality and guide their actions.
 This paper presents a critical genealogy of the triangle as a metaphor in devel-
opmental psychology. It does so with the two following aims. Firstly, it has the his-
torical aim of clarifying the origins of contemporary triadic models, as well as their 
differences and similarities. Secondly, it has a theoretical aim of extracting from the 
variety of triadic theories key themes for a productive theory of the role of the social 
in constituting psychological development.
 A Metaphor for the Social Development of Mind 
 If a metaphor is a semiotic tool, what is it that we want to better understand or 
theorise with the metaphor of the triangle? In this paper, we deal with triadic mod-
els which have been invoked to model psychological development through interac-
tion between person and world. Such models claim that development entails three 
irreducible elements – which are placed at the corners of a triangle, usually compris-
ing a subset of the elements subject, object, other, and sign – and theorise the rela-
tionships between these elements, represented as the sides of the triangle. Whereas 
binary models of the person-world relation construe the relationship as a direct one, 
triadic models emphasise that something or someone  mediates an agent’s action or 
understanding. We know that children need social interaction for normal develop-
ment, but triadic models (and this paper) ask: through what processes is social in-
teraction turned into human development? Or more precisely, how does the child, 
who is initially regulated by his/her parents, come to regulate his/her own ac-
tions?
 Thus, triangles are used to model the social basis of human cognition and the 
relation between interpersonal and intrapersonal developmental processes [e.g. 
Chapman, 1991; Danis, Bernard, & Leproux, 2000; Striano & Rochat, 1999]. These 
models are associated with a variety of conceptualisations of the relation between 
social interactions and psychological development, such as: internalisation [Vy-
gotsky, 1978; Valsiner, 2001], interiorisation [Klein, 1975; Piaget, 1974], equilibration 
[Piaget, 1974], appropriation [Rogoff, 2003], sociocognitive conflict [Mugny, Perret-
Clermont & Doise, 1981; Perret-Clermont, 1980], mentalisation [Fonagy et al., 2002], 
or symbolisation [Freud, 1900/2001a]. Our purpose here is not to review or evaluate 
this particular set of theories, as has been done elsewhere [Lawrence & Valsiner, 
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1993, 2003; Tudge, 1997; Valsiner, 1997], but to focus on the various uses of the tri-
angle metaphor to support such theoretical investigations.
 The theoretical focus of the paper on the social constitution of psychological 
development, then, sets the criteria for which three-part models are to be included 
in our analysis, and which are to be excluded. Three criteria were chosen: 
 (1) given that the focus is on psychological development, at least one element of 
the triangle should be a subject, a person who might develop;
 (2) for the model to represent an integrative theory, there should be explicit 
statements about the mutually dependent relationships between the elements of the 
triangle; this excludes triangles which are simply lists of three elements;
 (3) for the model to represent development, the triangle should not be static but 
should express change.
 These criteria led us to exclude some triadic models which are often quoted in 
psychology, such as Peirce’s [1998]. Peirce’s project was to understand processes of 
logic and signification. The structure of Peirce’s triangle is that objects mediate be-
tween signs and interpretants; Peirce’s primary concern with this triad was in its 
logical structure, and he found widespread evidence for this logical-semiotic struc-
ture: 
 
 In this sense, a word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a por-
trait represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition, a 
weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him who under-
stands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he influences. [Peirce, 
1868, section 9]
 Peirce’s triad is ‘developmental’ in the sense that the three elements can evolve: 
an interpretant can become an object for a subsequent sign and interpretant. But 
 his theory is not a theory of human development. It does not deal with the develop-
ment of psychological processes, and for this reason, it is excluded from the present 
analysis. 
 Restricting our focus to triangles which are explicitly used to conceptualise hu-
man development, our analysis has produced three core triangle metaphors. There 
is an emotional triangle originating with Freud, a mediational triangle initiated by 
Vygotsky, and a sociocognitive triangle rooted in the work of Piaget. Interestingly, 
as we shall demonstrate, in order to model development, each of these traditions put 
forward not one, but two triangles. We now turn to presenting these three core tri-
angle metaphors. We will discuss each in turn, before comparing, contrasting, and 
evaluating them. Finally, we will indicate possible directions for future theorisa-
tion.
 Three Families of Triangles 
 Our genealogy of triangles must begin with the dissatisfaction of many theo-
rists with dyadic models. The classic dyadic model is the behaviourist stimulus-re-
sponse model, in which learning is an accumulation of associations between stimu-
li in the world and the organism’s responses. Critiques of the behaviourist model 
have often preserved the person-world dyad as their basic unit. Dewey’s [1896] con-
cept of the act, for instance, focuses upon the individual’s relation to the physical 
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world, giving little attention to social interaction [Gillespie, 2005]. For others, the 
dissatisfaction with dyadic models was associated with a search for a more social 
theory of human development, in which the social and symbolic had a role to play. 
We suggest that this move from dyadic to triadic models is a paradigm shift, in a 
Kuhnian sense. 
 We have identified three sets of developmental triangles, located in different 
eras, countries, and scientific communities, which generated three relatively inde-
pendent traditions of research.  Figure 1 presents a genealogical tree, distinguishing 
the three traditions. In the first one, an ‘emotional’ pair of triangles addresses the 
emergence of the sign as enabling thinking. This was put forward by Freud, and 
subsequently developed by various schools of psycho-analysis. In the second branch, 
a ‘mediational’ pair of triangles addresses the cultural mediation of thinking. It was 
inaugurated by Vygotsky, and has since been developed and refined by sociocul-
tural psychology. The third branch, illustrating the ‘sociocognitive’ tradition, pur-
sues Piaget’s intuitions about the role of others as mediating the development of 
humans’ knowledge, and has been explored by social psychologists of develop-
ment.
 In this section, we explore each branch of our genealogical tree in turn. We first 
describe the theoretical specificity of the first generation of triangles of each branch. 
We then sum up each triangle on four dimensions: (1) the triangle’s theoretical pur-
poses and the questions it addresses; (2) the triangle’s corners (the elements compris-
ing the triangle); (3) the nature of its sides (the relation between the elements), and 
(4) the developmental theory which it represents. We then examine the more recent 
offspring of the initial triangles. 
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 The Emotional Tradition  
 In psycho-analytic triangular models, emotions are the driving force. Working 
with patients engaged in distorted forms of thinking, emotionally overwhelmed, or 
apparently deprived of affect, psycho-analysts try to account for the possibility of 
representational and verbal thinking. The question which is addressed by Freud and 
other psycho-analysts working with adults is: how is thinking possible at all? Recon-
structing adults’ past on the basis of their present discourse and conduct, as well as 
observing infants interacting with their mother, they thus ask: how did thinking 
emerge in the first place? 
 First Generation  
 In ‘The interpretation of dreams’ [1900/2001a], Sigmund Freud sets himself 
the task of accounting for the mental life that exists in dreams and thus starts 
building a model of the psychic apparatus. In chapter 7, Freud proposes an onto-
genetic explanation for the emergence of thinking through signs, starting with a 
model of mind as a reflex apparatus – a stimulus-response structure. At a certain 
point, internal needs appear in the organism of the infant, causing an internal 
modification (e.g., the experience of hunger). To account for the fact that the hun-
ger is perceived, one must postulate the existence of some intermediary between 
stimulus and response. Because of this internal modification, or need, the infant 
will be looking for satisfaction: he/she will make a noise or enter into a state of 
agitation. The mother, then, provides the child with some food (e.g., milk) which 
satisfies the need. The infant can now retain a perception of the satisfying object 
thus provided, and thus a mnesic trace of the object is united with the mnesic trace 
of the satisfaction of the need. Because of this mnesic trace, the need will now ap-
pear to the infant as a wish (for a certain satisfaction). The wish could be satisfied 
through the memory of the previous satisfaction, which would create a hallucina-
tory satisfaction (the real need, the hunger, is not satisfied by a memory of food). 
In contrast, the mother could acknowledge the need, and provide the child with an 
object to satisfy it. The real food would thus be united with the hallucinated food, 
the wish and the need would be satisfied at once. A sign is born here, at the meet-
ing of wish and reality, thanks to the acknowledgement of the mother. Freud has 
replaced a binary reflex apparatus with a psychic apparatus, that is, thinking me-
diated by signs.
 Yet the logic of direct satisfaction, characteristic of the reflex apparatus, does 
not disappear. Rather, two types of thinking processes will coexist. Freud distin-
guishes primary from secondary processes.  Primary processes are mental associa-
tions that are fluid and direct, quick, avoiding displeasure and looking for immedi-
ate satisfaction. They suppose a mind like a reflex apparatus, without delay or trans-
formation of signs. In contrast,  secondary processes are the unique product of a 
psychic apparatus that can hold experience in signs, delay and transform displea-
sure, or create complex causal chains. 
 We can now clarify the nature of this first emotional triangle, on the basis of our 
four dimensions. (1) This triangle examines how humans are able to reflect upon 
their emotions and experiences, and to delay the satisfaction of their needs. The key 
to this question is the process of symbolic elaboration (turning experiences into 
signs), and thus the question becomes: how does symbolisation emerge? (2) The cor-
5
  
ners of the triangle are the  subject (the child), an  other (the mother), and an  object by 
which the mother satisfies the need she recognises in her child. (3) The sides of the 
triangle represent emotional and representational relationships. The mother recog-
nises and feels the needs of the child, and the object satisfies them; but as it becomes 
a sign, it  represents these experiences. (4) The developmental theory here is that sym-
bolic thinking develops through interaction with a caregiver and a desired object. 
Development is expressed by a transformation of the first triangle into a second one. 
There is first a  subject-other-object triangle, in which  subject wants  object.  Other then 
replaces the  object with a name or a  sign, and the child  subject learns to use the  sign 
to act on the  other to cause her to provide the  object. There is thus a second triangle, 
a  subject-other-sign triangle (see left-hand branch of the genealogical tree,  fig. 1 ). Fi-
nally, the  subject is able to regulate himself/herself thanks to  signs,  in a  subject-sign-
subject triangle. This last process, from  subject-sign-other to  subject-sign-subject can 
also represent the development of adults’ self-understanding in the psycho-analyti-
cal setting. As André Green [2000, 2002] describes it, the  subject addresses a dis-
course to  other, who in turn replies with interpretations  (signs), thanks to which 
 subjects can make sense of their own experience, coming to reflect on that experi-
ence, and to regulate it. 
 Offspring  
 Psycho-analysts have emphasised another emotional triangle present in Freud’s 
work: the  father-mother-child triangle [Freud, 1905/2001b]. It is often referred to as 
the ‘oedipal configuration.’ This triangle is often understood as expressing a funda-
mental anthropological distinction structuring human life: the difference between 
sexes  (father-mother) and the difference between generations  (father-child, mother-
child). For some authors, the oedipal triangle is foundational to the emergence of 
language and sign: the father imposes the verb, which separates the previously fused 
mother and child [Lacan, 1966]. Such ideas have led to research on the basic family 
triad [Corboz-Warnery & Fivaz-Depeursinge, 1999; Kerig, 1995; Stern, 1985]. How-
ever, if we ask the developmental question of how symbolic thinking emerges, the 
family triad, in fact, must return to the  subject-other-sign triangle. The mother  (oth-
er) is absent to the child  (subject) in so far as she thinks about the father  (sign). The 
child  (subject), trying to reach the absent-minded mother  (other), has then to think 
 (sign) [Green, 2000]. 
 On the other hand, the object relations school of psycho-analysis has departed 
from the triangular metaphor, and can be characterised as giving a dyadic  (subject-
object) reading of Freud [Green, 2000, 2002]. In Melanie Klein’s [1975] theorisation 
of the psychic life of the infant, the infant is seen as having basic feelings or drives 
directed towards some ‘objects’ of investment (cathexis). Given the dependency of 
the infant, the first and major object of investment is the ‘breast,’ the fantasmic ap-
prehension of the caregiver as satisfying or frustrating basic needs. By extension, the 
mother, and then every other that plays a role in a person’s emotional life, is called 
an ‘object.’ The relation between  subject and  object is an emotional relationship, 
working through binary mechanisms such as projection and introjection. Note that 
‘object’ here designates what we usually call  other. The focus of attention is on this 
relationship between two people, one being called  object; there is no reference to an 
object or reality external to that relationship. There is thus no space for mediation in 
such a theory of thinking. 
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 Similarly, attachment theory, initially a triadic model – the relationship devel-
oping between child and caregiver is mediated by some emerging mental model in 
the child [Bowlby, 1969], which can be reported on other relationships – is often re-
duced to a binary model – a given relationship is of this or that type [e.g., Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987, 1990]. The reduction of a triad to a dyad also suppresses the potential 
dynamics of the model, such as the co-evolution of attachment interactions and 
mental models. 
 Interestingly, a recent stream of research has reintroduced the initial psycho-
analytical theory of symbolisation, supported by current work on the ‘theory of 
mind.’ Fonagy and his colleagues show the importance of the mother’s reflective 
functioning, that is, her capacity to think about her thinking and about her child as 
a thinking person, in the constitution of the child’s ability to symbolise [Fonagy, 
1999; Fonagy et al., 2002]. As Fonagy [2000] writes, this model of the birth of the 
psychological self can be seen as a variation on the Cartesian  cogito: ‘My caregiver 
thinks of me as thinking and therefore I exist as a thinker.’ Thus, the relationship 
between mother, infant, and mother’s verbal or non-verbal recognition of the child’s 
emotional state, a  subject-other-sign triad, becomes an internalised,  subject-sign-sub-
ject  triad when the child is able to self-regulate.
 The Mediational Tradition 
 The second tradition which we consider begins with Vygotsky. There are two 
important triangles in Vygotsky’s writings ( fig. 1 , central column, two triangles in 
the first generation). The first pertains to the intrapsychological structure of the 
sign: an auxiliary stimulus mediates a basic stimulus-response relation. The second 
articulates the interpsychological relation: the mother mediates the relation of the 
child toward some object –  a  subject-other-object triangle – and this leads to the cre-
ation of a  sign. Each of these triangles will be discussed in turn, followed by a discus-
sion of how these triangles have been developed more recently.
 First Generation  
 Initially, Vygotsky was committed to the stimulus-response paradigm. How-
ever, in the mid 1920s, he came to realise that human behaviour is often structur-
ally different from the behaviour of other animals. Specifically, he observed that 
children do not solve problems in the same way as the chimpanzees that Köhler 
[1925] observed: unlike chimpanzees, self-talk is often fundamental to problem 
solving amongst children. In order to account for this, Vygotsky did not abandon the 
stimulus-response model completely, but instead added a third element, the auxil-
iary stimulus, which marks a discontinuity in development.
 Auxiliary stimuli differ from other stimuli because they possess the function of 
‘reverse action’ [Vygotsky & Luria, 1994, p. 145]. An auxiliary stimulus is first of all 
a response, but then that response itself becomes a stimulus to the organism, calling 
out a subsequent response. The ‘reverse action’ lies in the fact that the organism’s 
own response becomes a stimulus to the same organism. Vygotsky often gives the 
example of the knot in the handkerchief as an  aide-mémoire.  The knot in the hand-
kerchief is a response at time one (to the need to remember something), which will, 
at time two, be a stimulus to remember the thing to be remembered. Thus, the knot 
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in the handkerchief is an auxiliary stimulus that mediates natural memory. Simi-
larly, words are auxiliary stimuli. They are responses which can also become stimu-
li. This is evident, for example, when people react to their own utterances. ‘Reverse 
action,’ Vygotsky and Luria [1994, p. 145] write, ‘transfers the psychological opera-
tion to higher and qualitatively new forms, permitting man, by the aid of outer stim-
uli,  to control his behaviour from without.’  Auxiliary stimuli are like tools in that they 
mediate action, but there is an important difference: while tools enable humans to 
master the world, it is the reverse action of signs that enable humans to master them-
selves.
 Drawing an auxiliary stimulus does not produce a triangle, but, rather, a ‘V’ 
shape [e.g., Vygotsky & Luria, 1994, p. 144] (see figure 2). However, because stim-
uli of the second order coexist with normal stimulus-response relations, a third line 
can be drawn across the top of the ‘V’, creating a triangle [Cole, 1996, p. 120]. The 
‘V’ part of the diagram represents the cultural, or mediated, relation, while the top 
of the triangle is the natural stimulus-response relation, which coexists with the 
cultural relation. Although each side of the ‘V’ is also a stimulus-response relation, 
it must be emphasised that the auxiliary stimulus is qualitatively different to basic 
stimulus-response relations and, as we shall see, has a distinct developmental tra-
jectory. It is interesting to note the similarity in this distinction between natural 
and cultural relations and Freud’s distinction between primary and secondary pro-
cesses.
 We can now describe Vygotsky’s first triangle in terms of our four dimensions. 
(1) This triangle theorises higher mental functions, specifically the dynamics of self-
regulation. (2) The corners of the triangle are stimuli and responses, with the third 
corner being an auxiliary stimulus (both a stimulus and a response). (3) Each of the 
three sides of the triangle is a stimulus-response relation. (4) Vygotsky’s account of 
the sign, or auxiliary stimulus, is genetic. However, in order to understand his ac-
count of how the sign develops we need to consider Vygotsky’s second triangle. This 
second triangle emerges as a response to the question of how the cultural relation is 
formed – or how auxiliary stimuli become established. It is a  subject-other-object  tri-
angle, designating the mutual relationship of child, mother, and object. Although 
this triangle is not drawn by Vygotsky, and as such is implicit in his writing, it is fun-
damental to his theorisation of development. It is clearly evident in his account of 
the development of pointing. 
Auxiliary
stimulus
ResponseStimulus
 Fig. 2. The auxiliary stimulus. 
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 Pointing is an auxiliary stimulus: it is a response to something, which in turn is 
a stimulus to someone else, or to self (as when a child points to the words he/she is 
supposed to read). Pointing, Vygotsky [1978, p. 56; 1997, p. 104] argues, develops out 
of the child’s grasping and the mother’s response to that grasping. At first the child 
is not self-conscious of pointing, and thus is not trying to communicate anything. 
Rather, the child is simply reaching for something out of reach. However, from the 
perspective of the mother, the child’s reaching is meaningful, it indicates that the 
child desires the reached-for object and accordingly the mother brings the child the 
desired object. The essential point is that the grasping first has the meaning of point-
ing for the mother, and only later does it have this meaning for the child. The child 
comes to know the meaning of his/her grasping by internalising the perspective of 
the mother, and thus reacting to his/her own gesture in the same way as the mother 
has reacted. That is to say, the child’s response of grasping has become a stimulus for 
the child (i.e., an auxiliary stimulus). 
 This  subject-other-object  triangle is fundamentally different to the auxiliary 
stimulus triangle, which becomes clear when we consider this triangle on our four 
dimensions. (1) The purpose of this triangle is to theorise the genetic formation of 
auxiliary stimuli. (2) The corners of the triangle are  subject (child), object, and other 
 (mother). (3) The relations along the sides of the triangle are social relations. (4) Aux-
iliary stimuli, or  signs, the basis of cultural intelligence, are formed within the child 
through the interaction.
 Before moving on to discuss the ways in which Vygotsky’s triangles have been 
taken up and elaborated, we would like to make brief reference to the work of Mead 
[1912, 1922]. While one can make historical connections between Mead and Vy-
gotsky through the work of Baldwin, Dewey, and James, there is no evidence to sug-
gest that either Mead or Vygotsky read each other’s work [Valsiner & van der Veer, 
1988]. This makes the parallels between their ideas particularly striking. Both Mead 
and Vygotsky take as problematic the nature and genesis of the way in which ideas, 
or semiotic structures, mediate human action. What is worthy of note is that they 
both formulate a similar conception of these semiotic structures. Mead’s concept of 
‘significant symbols’ and Vygotsky’s concept of ‘signs’ share the idea of reverse action 
[Gillespie, 2007]. For both Mead and Vygotsky, signs, or significant symbols, do not 
simply stand for or even mediate an individual’s relation to the world, rather they 
enable the individual to turn upon himself/herself and to mediate himself/herself. 
The difference between Mead and Vygotsky is in how they account for the genesis of 
the sign or significant symbol. As we have seen, Vygotsky describes how grasping 
becomes pointing for the child once the child has internalised the orientation of the 
mother. For Mead, however, this process of internalisation occurs by virtue of child 
and mother repeatedly exchanging social roles within a social act [Gillespie, 2005, 
2006; Martin, 2006]. Despite this difference in mechanism, however, we argue the 
similarities between Mead and Vygotsky justify dealing with them as conceptually 
(not historically) part of the same lineage.
 Offspring  
 The process by which the child-mother-object triangle produces the stimulus-
auxiliary stimulus-response triangle has become known as the process of internali-
sation. The basic idea has proved both influential and controversial. In Russia, the 
idea was taken forward by Leontiev [1981] in his account of the beater and the hunt. 
9
  
The beater, by chasing away the prey, acts in a way that contravenes the natural im-
pulse to apprehend prey. The beater’s activity can only be understood within a larg-
er system of a division of labour. The beater’s activity is subsumed to the interests of 
the group, who collectively apprehend the prey. Leontiev’s point is that the beater’s 
reflective awareness, or mediated relation to self, is a product of the group relations. 
Thus again we see Vygotsky’s basic idea, that the structure of social interaction is 
transposed into the structure of self-mediation.
 More recently, Vygotsky’s concept of internalisation has attracted a criticism 
that it implies a subject-object dualism, because, it has been argued, something 
moves from the external world to a distinct internal realm [Wertsch & Stone, 1985; 
Lawrence & Valsiner 1993, 2003; Toomela, 1996; Tomasello, 1999]. This critique has 
motivated several researchers to cease referring to the intrapsychological, and in-
stead to focus upon clearly observable activities and shared activities [Lave  & Wenger, 
1991; Rogoff, 1995, 2003] and a new, single,  subject-medium-object  triangle has 
emerged. In this new triangle, a  medium (usually a cultural artefact, such as  a tool or 
a word) mediates the  subject’s relation to the  object. This triangle is, by design, no 
longer an account of internalisation, and thus does not provide for  those researchers 
interested in the question of the emergence of symbolisation or semiotic mediation 
[Josephs, 1998; Valsiner 1998, 1999, 2001]. Consequently, some researchers have 
worked to incorporate Peirce’s triadic conception of symbolisation into the  subject-
medium-object triangle [e.g., Moro & Rodriguez, 1992]. However, such theorising, 
we suggest, does not solve the developmental question – as we have suggested above, 
Peirce’s triad is semiotic, not developmental. Moreover, the move to a  subject-medi-
um-object triangle can create some theoretical confusion. 
 Consider, for example, Cole’s [1996, p. 119] discussion of the difference between 
natural and cultural relations. In this discussion, there is a slippage from Vygotsky’s 
auxiliary stimulus model to a  subject-medium-object model: 
 Through active attempts to appropriate their surroundings to their own goals, people in-
corporate auxiliary means (including very significantly, other people) into their actions, 
giving rise to the distinctive triadic relation of subject-medium-object. [Cole, 1996,
p. 119]
 Translating stimulus into subject and response into object is problematic. Stim-
uli and responses are both relations between subjects and objects. This slippage in-
troduces into the triangle a  subject-object dualism which was not initially in Vy-
gotsky’s model. Moreover, this slippage obscures the uniqueness of the auxiliary 
stimulus as something that can be both interpersonal (as in the  subject-other-object 
triangle) and intrapersonal (as in the case of self-regulation). While Cole must sim-
ply take the existence and properties of cultural artefacts (the  medium )  as given, 
Vygotsky’s model using stimulus and response terms is powerful enough to articu-
late both the genesis and the properties of cultural artefacts. In the case of the child 
grasping, the desired object is the stimulus, the child’s grasping is both a response to 
the object and a stimulus to the mother. Thus, in this case, the auxiliary stimulus is 
distributed across the relationship between child, other, and object ( subject-other-
object triangle). However, once the perspective of the mother is internalised, and 
thus the child can react to his/her own grasping as indicating some desire, then the 
auxiliary stimulus has become partly intrapsychological (i.e., when the child uses 
pointing to direct his/her own attention) or completely intrapsychological (i.e., when 
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the child’s thought becomes a stimulus for his/her next thought). Thus, while Vy-
gotksy’s stimulus-auxiliary stimulus-response triangle makes visible some of the dy-
namics of internalisation, more recent subject-medium-object triangles obscure this 
dynamic. However, on the positive side, the more recent  subject-medium-object tri-
angles seem to be easier to operationalise, as, in complex social contexts outside the 
laboratory, subject, medium, and object seem to be  useful ways of parsing the world. 
The applicability of this basic idea is evident in the work that has followed from 
Engeström’s [1999] expanded version of the  subject-medium-object triangle. Along 
the base of an extended triangle, Engeström has added rules, community, and divi-
sion of labour, thus making the model  particularly useful for studying institutional 
activity [e.g., Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki, 1999], but, we would add, not so 
useful for studying internalisation. 
 The Sociocognitive Tradition 
 The third tradition which we consider begins with Piaget. For Piaget, social in-
teraction was a necessary condition for the development of humans as intelligent 
beings. However, if this social component of development was explicit in his early 
texts, it moved to the background in his later writings, in which he appeared to be 
more interested in exploring the cognitive aspects of the processes of development. 
Partly due to this difference of emphasis [Döbert, 2004], there is still some disagree-
ment about the role of the social in Piaget’s work [Duveen, 1997]. Consequently, it is 
also unclear to what extent Piaget’s work can be seen as triadic. In contrast, the gen-
eration of researchers who followed Piaget concentrated their efforts on exploring 
the consequences of a triadic, that is, a social and cultural, understanding of cogni-
tive development. 
 First Generation  
 Piaget was concerned with the development of mental structures, specifically 
operational structures which he defined as co-ordinated and interiorised actions in 
the world that can be reversed (e.g., the conservation of liquids). These structures 
could only develop out of the child’s interactions with others and the world. Al-
though he admitted the necessary role of social interaction at a theoretical level, he 
did not empirically explore the social dimension in the development of operational 
structures. In his early work, Piaget discusses the role of different types of social re-
lationships in the emergence of knowledge from a theoretical perspective. In his 
writings on the  Moral Judgment of the Child [Piaget, 1932], Piaget distinguished two 
types of social relations: social relations of constraint and social relations of coop-
eration. There is  constraint when one participant has more power than the other to-
wards some knowledge. The relationship is asymmetrical, and consequently, the 
knowledge which can be acquired takes a fixed and inflexible form. Piaget refers to 
this process as one of social transmission. By contrast, in  cooperative relations, pow-
er is more evenly distributed between participants. A more symmetrical relationship 
ensues, and the knowledge which emerges is assumed to be more decentred and the 
result of a coordination of different perspectives. Necessary knowledge [Smith, 
1993], the normative form of knowledge that is based on logical implication, can be 
achieved only through such relations of cooperation. One could describe an implic-
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it  subject-other-object triadic model in such explanation. In a relationship of coop-
eration, the role of the  other would be that of supporting and sustaining the develop-
ment of the  subject toward the  object. Piaget gives particular attention to this role in 
his  Sociological Studies  [Piaget, 1977/1995]. 
 Later on, Piaget came to focus more centrally on the equilibration of cognitive 
structures within a single cognitive system, and his early orientation to the impor-
tance of social processes loses prominence. Thus, although his clinical interviews 
and experimentation relied heavily on social interaction between adult and child, 
this facet of his empirical work was only discussed as a methodological introduction 
in his book on the child’s conception of the world [Piaget, 1929] and not as an inte-
grated part of his empirical findings.
 Formulating his operative theory of the development of intelligence, Piaget 
came to conceptualise intelligence as arising from the coordination of actions 
 (the logic of action) and, subsequently, the interiorisation of external acts into men-
tal acts, in a development from sensorimotor reasoning to symbolic and  operational 
intelligence [Furth, 1969]. It is possible to pick out triadic developmental processes 
in this model. At the sensorimotor level, the infant’s functioning  can be described as 
based on two dyadic relationships: the perception of an object creates a figuration of 
an object, and that figuration creates an action. One might say that the sight of the 
graspable object automatically elicits a reaction of grasping. In the transition from 
sensorimotor stage to preoperational thinking, the symbol emerges at the decou-
pling of these two initially connected relationships, and  enables the child to ‘know’ 
the object without grasping it. Note that in such triadic constitution of the symbol, 
there is no explicit need for another person’s mediation. The implicit triangle here 
would be a  subject (operation)-object-sign one. This may be a model of internal me-
diation, but it is not an explanation of the role of social interaction in constituting 
such internal processes [Carpendale & Müller, 2004]. 
 Some of Piaget’s collaborators perceived this gap in the model, and partly as re-
action to his emphasis on the cognitive, decided to reconsider the role of social in-
teraction in development, as it was presented in Piaget’s early work. These studies, 
later called the ‘first generation’ of post-Piagetian studies [Perret-Clermont, 1993], 
examined the role of the other in the construction of intelligence, and of the modes 
of relationship that the subject could have to the other. A triangle was explicitly used 
to represent the  subject - other - object relationship. This triadic theory was partly in-
spired by readings of Mead [1934], Vygotsky, the sociological work of Bernstein [see 
Perret-Clermont, 1980], as well as the impulse of Moscovici [1972; see Mugny, Per-
ret-Clermont, & Doise, 1981], which encouraged a reorientation from dyadic to tri-
adic theories in social psychology. 
 One explicit outcome of the resocialisation of Piaget’s work was the notion of 
 sociocognitive conflict. The notion designated the fact that subject and other could 
have divergent perspectives on the same object. The subject could then interiorise 
these divergent perspectives, which could, under some conditions – a symmetrical 
relationship, concentration on the task rather than on the interpersonal relationship 
[Mugny, De Paolis, & Carugati, 1984] – create a decentration, leading to a new cog-
nitive elaboration. The cognitive coordination of social perspectives was thus posed 
as a crucial developmental mechanism. 
 This line of research can be described in terms of our four dimensions as fol-
lows. (1) The question is: how do social interactions contribute to the emergence of 
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more complex operational structures? (2) The triangle is a  subject-other-object  tri-
angle. (3) The  subject-other relationship is embedded in the social fabric; each subject 
constructs a representation of the  object through interiorised actions in his or her 
own way. (4) Development is here seen as linked to the interiorisation and coordina-
tion of conflicting perspectives. 
 Offspring  
 Different threads of research followed these studies working with a sociocogni-
tive triangle metaphor. A first line of research can be said to have tried to overcome 
the lack of the ‘social’ in Piaget by extending the  subject-other relationship to a so-
ciocognitive triangle. Chapman [1991, 1999] sought to emphasise the social aspects 
of Piagetian theorising, drawing on Vygotskyian insights. He called his conception 
of the  subject-other-object  triangle an ‘epistemic triangle,’ and described it in terms 
of two subsystems of binary relations  (subject-object, subject-other).  Chapman con-
siders the subject-object interactions as asymmetrical since the subject is active and 
the object merely conforms (or not) to the expectations of the subject. He then con-
sidered subject-other interactions, with development becoming more and more sym-
metrical in the sense that both participants become capable of taking the same active 
roles in turn. In much of the post-Piagetian work on the epistemic triangle, the im-
portance of the social dimension is formulated in terms of the interaction of differing 
intentional beings [e.g., Müller & Carpendale, 2000, 2004; Tomasello, 1999]. But 
these intentional participants are not typically considered in terms of their societal-
ly structured roles, which shape and constrain the perspectives that they can adopt 
towards the object of knowledge. 
 A second line of post-Piagetian research has deepened the understanding of the 
‘social’ dimension of the sociocognitive triangle. The meaning of ‘social’ here is not 
the mere presence of the other, or the fact that one subject can understand the other’s 
intentions, but the fact that the whole  subject-other-object system takes place in a so-
cial world, that is, a world structured by social positions, values, rules, and discours-
es. Thus, factors such as gender, age, perceived status, or cultural capital all consti-
tute the social positions and thus the perspectives of the participants in an epistemic 
triangle. It was argued that higher ‘levels of analysis’ should be brought into the ex-
planation of cognitive development, to examine not only interpersonal dynamics, 
but also intergroup and ideological ones [Doise, 1986].
 A notable feature of this second generation of post-Piagetian studies was its at-
tention to the particular character of the  object of knowledge, from the point of view 
that different objects have different significances to the participants, and that these 
are often shaped by the institutional context of the interaction. Schubauer-Leoni and 
Perret-Clermont [1997], reflecting on the trajectory of their own research, suggested 
that during the ‘first generation,’ the new interest in social interaction had come to 
dominate the consideration of the  subject-other-object triangle, so that the object 
dropped out of focus, to leave a rather bipolar interest in subject-other relations. In 
the ‘second generation,’ they write, 
 when we started to take more explicitly into consideration the type of task set at the center 
of the joint activity … it became obvious that the object played a central role not only as a 
‘task’ but also as a mediation permitting the specification of a system of social positions 
in which the adult is in a high position asking the questions. Formerly bipolar (subject-
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object; or peer-peer), the model becomes now clearly tripolar: questioner-questionee(s)-
object and integrates the experiment as constituent of the observation. [Schubauer-Leoni 
& Perret-Clermont, 1997, p. 271]
 In this approach, the particular object about which knowledge is being created 
has an impact on the relationships between the participants and the process of their 
interaction. The significance of the object is shaped by the institutional context in 
which it is located, and entails social expectations about how each participant is go-
ing to relate to that object [Grossen & Perret-Clermont, 1994; Perret-Clermont, Per-
ret, & Bell 1991; Schoultz, Säljö & Wyndhamn, 2001; Schubauer-Leoni & Grossen, 
1993]. For example, the object ‘mathematical problem’ is defined by the educational 
institution. In the frame of a classroom, the mathematical problem can make a stu-
dent feel incompetent in front of an other identified as a good student. It has a pow-
er to lead some people to be classified as weak students, and others to be supported 
to pursue further studies. Such observations also led researchers to reflect on their 
role in testing situations.
 More recently, other authors proposed a ‘third generation’ of post-Piagetian 
studies by locating configurations of  subject-other-object  triangle in their societal 
context [Duveen & Psaltis, in press; Psaltis, 2005a, b] and claiming a constructive 
role for social asymmetries. Such studies have shown how children’s interactions 
around a task are modulated by social representations of gender so that asymmetries 
themselves can become constructive. Gendered expectations of expertise, for in-
stance, in the primary school classroom shaped interactions between boys and girls 
on a conservation of liquid task. For some non-conserving boys, a conserving girl 
proved to be a surprise, stimulating cognitive activity, and subsequent improvement 
on the conservation task [Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007]. 
 Relations between the Triangles 
 Our initial question was how triangle models could contribute to a psychology 
of development, and especially, to a psychology of development in which the social 
is constitutive. We can now summarise the main specificities, commonalities, and 
contributions of each triangle. 
 Distinctions 
 In the emotional triangles, two persons respond to and influence each others’ 
emotions and representations through the use of signs. The mediational triangles 
focus on the mediation of the person’s relation to an object (including a reflexive re-
lation to oneself as an object) through the use of signs. The sociocognitive triangles 
link two persons and an object, around which an interaction, thinking, and action 
take place. It shows the role of communication and identities in the development of 
knowledge. 
 The psychological processes through which development is thought to occur in 
each tradition are also distinct. In the emotional triangles, emotions are fundamen-
tal in the relationship of the person to himself/herself, the other, and objects. Objects 
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or other are then replaced by signs, and even these are emotionally laden, although 
some of their function is precisely to elaborate these emotions. The mediational tri-
angles emphasise the responses of others as fundamental in constituting the mean-
ing of an object or gesture for the child. Signs within this tradition are entwined with 
the other, and enable self-regulation from the standpoint of the other. In the socio-
cognitive tradition, it is conflicts between different representations of the object that 
are the occasion for development, with the existence and awareness of such conflicts 
being stimulated by the different social positions occupied by the participants. 
 Similarities 
 There are some interesting parallels between the various triangles. For example, 
there are two striking similarities between Vygotsky and psycho-analysis. Firstly, 
they both have comparable triangular theories of the nature of symbolic thinking 
(representation). In psycho-analysis, the representation is formed by a combination 
of a need and the memory of satisfaction of that need by an other. In Vygotsky, the 
representation is formed by a combination of the person’s response (which could be 
seen as a need) and the memory, or imagination, of how this response appears to oth-
ers. Both of these theories are thus similar to Mead’s theory of signs being formed 
through the combination of an embodied actor perspective (desires and responses) 
with a more distant observer’s perspective (the other’s reaction to that desire or re-
sponse) [Mead, 1922; Gillespie, 2005].
 Secondly, both Freud and Vygotsky have an understanding of the role of  other 
as providing the  subject with  signs which enable the transformation of an experience 
into meaning. This is visible in the parallel between the model of the therapeutic re-
lation in Freud and the adult-child relationship in Vygotsky. The psycho-analytical 
patient, like Vygotsky’s grasping child, expresses something without knowing its 
meaning for the other. The patient recounts a dream. The therapeutic relation hing-
es upon the analyst finding surplus meaning [Gillespie, 2003] in the dream, and then 
feeding this interpretation back to the patient. The therapist guides the patient to a 
new understanding of his/her own dream, so that there is consciousness where pre-
viously there was unconsciousness [Wilson & Weinstein, 1997]. This process is 
structurally very similar to the process through which the child develops an under-
standing of pointing through the adult’s recognition of his/her grasping. Contempo-
rary research using experimental and observational methods confirms the impor-
tance of such triadic relations in the development of symbolic thinking. Fonagy et 
al. [2002] show, for example, how the child’s disorganised physical actions linked to 
their state of affect need to be answered in a relatively predicable way, and labelled 
or commented upon by his mother or father (e.g., ‘oh, this is my hungry boy!’). That 
is to say, the action requires recognition by an  other, who provides the sign for self to 
make sense of self ’s own action. 
 There is also an important similarity between the sociocognitive and emotion-
al triangles, in that both give weight to the other’s recognition of the person and his/
her action. In the sociocognitive triangle, the participants are not oriented only to-
wards the object, but also towards each other, and for knowledge to develop it re-
quires a mutual recognition of the (possible) validity of each others’ orientation to 
the object. In the emotional triangle, the development of signs depends upon the 
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other appropriately recognising the emotional state of the person and his/her repre-
sentation of the object, as well as the possible divergences between the participants’ 
representations and emotions. Recent formulations of sociocognitive approaches, 
integrating advances in theory of mind research, can also be seen as speaking to the 
same question of recognition [Garton & Pratt, 2001; Howley & Howe, 2004]. 
 Finally, the first generations of all three triangles put forward a structurally 
similar model of development. In each case, actions and interactions taking place in 
a socially shared reality are internalised to a mental plane, leading to the transforma-
tion of the thinking of the person, and in turn changing the subject’s capacity for 
acting and interacting. The subject appears, not as a disembodied cognitive subject, 
but as an embodied social being, whose capacity for thinking and acting are highly 
dependent on his/her emotions and sense of identity, which in turn depend upon the 
interpersonal context. 
 Contributions of the Genealogical Analysis 
 This paper set out two aims: clarifying the historical origins of contemporary 
triadic models, and extracting key themes for a theory of the role of the social in de-
velopment. In order to do so, a genealogical reading of triangle metaphors in devel-
opmental psychology has been proposed. What can we learn from this genealogical 
reading? 
 Firstly, in response to our historical aim, the genealogy has brought out the his-
torical continuities within the various traditions and has identified some striking 
similarities between traditions. But it has also revealed important historical discon-
tinuities and differences, which might otherwise be obfuscated by the veneer of sim-
ilarity provided by a common metaphor. By historically tracing the different mean-
ings of the various triangles, we have clarified a terminology for the various con-
figurations of developmental triangles – with combinations of the terms ‘subject,’ 
‘sign,’ ‘other,’ and ‘object’ designating the corners, and having distinguished differ-
ent relations between these terms: representational, emotional, and mediational. 
 This work of clarification can help us in reading contemporary work. Let us 
consider, for instance, Hobson’s [2002] theory of development, articulated in a tri-
angle of the infant, the world, and the other (initially the mother): a  subject-other-
object  triangle. For Hobson, the mechanism of development is ‘a particular species 
of identification’ (p. 106). While the infant acts toward the world, the other acts to-
ward the infant’s action. Then, by degrees, the infant is led to identify with the other, 
thus coming to adopt the perspective of the other, and thus cultivating a perspective 
upon self. Reading this triangle through the distinctions that we have made, the con-
stituents of Hobson’s triangle match those of the sociocognitive tradition, but the 
driving psychological processes are emotional ones. According to our analysis, his-
torically, such emotional triangles required a  subject-sign-other configuration to ex-
plain the move from the social relations to psychological development. Similarly, if 
the perspective of  other becomes a means to transform the  subject’s  relation to the 
 object,  then the perspective of other has to become a  sign  in a  subject-object-sign  re-
lationship. In other words, our analysis suggests that the  subject-object-sign  triangle 
could be incorporated into Hobson’s analysis in order to further specify the process 
of internalisation.
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 Secondly, in relation to our theoretical aim of identifying core ideas for under-
standing the social constitution of psychological development, our analysis flags 
two quite different approaches over time. It is notable that each ‘first generation’ 
theory proposed two triangles, with a more ‘social’ one turning into a more ‘mental’ 
one. These early generation theorists used a duality between social and mental, in 
order to consider the relation between them. However, in later generations (of the 
mediational and sociocognitive triangles), authors have been less comfortable with 
the notion of a distinct ‘internal’ mental space, seeing this as a subject-world dual-
ism, and thus, have tended to use single triangles, focused on the ‘social’ phase of 
the process of development  (subject-other-object, or  subject-mediator-object). In the 
mediational tradition, this process can be seen in the turn to ethnography and ob-
servation [Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 1995]. Yet it has been suggested that effacing the in-
trapsychological component of triangle models makes it impossible to have a devel-
opmental theory, strictly speaking [Toomela, 1999; Valsiner, 2006], in the sense of 
the emergence of qualitative psychological change. Inversely, the emotional tradi-
tion has often neglected the necessary social interactions for the emergence of 
mind. 
 Our historical reading highlights important features of development as mod-
elled by triangles that merit further research. For example, dynamics of social rec-
ognition have been noted as important in the sociocognitive and the mediational 
tradition. In the emotional one, the emotional quality of the recognition can shape 
the elaboration of signs, and consequently reflections about the self. Given that each 
tradition hints towards the importance of recognition, further integrative theorising 
that borrows from all three traditions may be fruitful [Psaltis & Duveen, 2007]. A 
further issue identified, but to date not fully investigated, is the role of the social con-
text in the wider sense: the ideological and institutional constitution of those inter-
personal relations that are the setting for development. 
 Conclusion 
 This paper has proposed a critical examination of the uses of the metaphor of a 
triangle as a tool for developmental psychology. We described three main uses of 
triangles, which we called emotional, mediational, and sociocognitive. Freud, Vy-
gotsky, and Piaget, who we identified as authors of the first generations of triangle 
models, all used at least two states of their triangles. In each case, their first triangle 
modelled some form of mediated interaction, either  person-other-object or  person-
tool-object. The second triangle represented an intrapsychological triangle, either in 
the form of  person time 1-sign-person time 2, or  person-sign (operation)-object. The 
developmental theory is thus that development is a process of moving from the first, 
interactional triangle to the second, self-regulating triangle. 
 Authors working in the line opened by these first generation theorists have tak-
en various approaches, some focusing on only one of the triangles of the first gen-
eration, others combining two of the developmental triangles, and others combining 
one of the first generation triangles with a non-developmental triangle such as 
Peirce’s [Chapman, 1991, 1999; Moro & Rodriguez, 1992]. 
 We can see some of the recent attempts to develop new triangles as addressing 
the limitation of the three terms of initial triangles. Authors of the first generation 
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were interested in ontogenetic development; that is, the aim was to show how a func-
tion was constructed for the first time in the developing child. Given such a focus, a 
limitation to three terms can be helpful. Thus, for instance, motor interaction in a 
preverbal infant can profitably be modelled as a  person-object-other  interaction. Or 
the  person-sign-object  triangle can show the emergence of sign use. However, a lim-
itation of these models emerged when trying to understand processes of develop-
ment in later years and in adulthood, which seem to call for the interdependency of 
at least four constituents. If, as many researchers now acknowledge, we consider that 
development is an ongoing, lifelong process, then three-term models are insufficient. 
For instance, a child who is already capable of social interaction and speech can be 
solving a puzzle alternating speech to self and talking to another person. Similarly, 
an adult solving a new computing task usually draws simultaneously on his/her cog-
nitive resources while asking co-workers for advice, or by using a manual – a cul-
tural tool – to support his/her thinking. In other words, if we want to account for 
lifelong development, beyond ontogenesis (the initial construction of psychological 
functions), in the subsequent genesis of further skills and knowledge, person, other, 
object, and sign are all likely to be co-present. 
 There are many ways of including these four components in our theories. We 
can write textually about them, we can try to represent them through new models 
which graphically represent transformations or reconfigurations of triangles, or 
we might even do away with the triangle metaphor and choose a new metaphor 
with four poles. It is to overcome such limitations of the initial core triangles that 
various authors have thus proposed alternative metaphors: Werner and Kaplan’s 
[1963] addressor-addressee-object-symbol model, the expanded neo-Vygotskian 
triangle [Engeström, 1999, 2005], the triangle of the inner alter in dialogical think-
ing [Marková, 2006], variations of prism models [Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, in 
press, Zittoun, 2006] or embedded triangles [Psaltis, 2005a]. Thus, as with other 
tools, metaphors have their affordances, their side-effects, and their unexpected 
consequences. Awareness of what our tools were designed to do, and how they have 
developed, can facilitate an informed use of them. But if there is a discrepancy be-
tween the effects of the tool and one’s original aims, one might want to invent a 
new one.
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